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Entry into licensed professions requires meeting competency requirements, typ-
ically assessed through licensing examinations. This paper explores whether the
number of individuals attempting to enter a profession (potential supply) a¤ects
the di¢ culty of the entry examination. The empirical results suggest that a larger
potential supply may lead to more di¢ cult licensing exams and lower pass rates.
This implies that licensing may partially shelter the market from supply shocks and
limit the impact of policies targeted at increasing labor supply.
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1 Introduction
For an increasing number of occupations, people seeking to enter the profession must sat-
isfy a number of requirements set by state licensing boards. This usually means passing a
licensing examination and meeting educational, residency and moral character and tness
requirements. According to Kleiner (2000), over 800 occupations are licensed in at least
one U.S. state, including lawyers, accountants, auditors, teachers, nurses, engineers, psy-
chologists, barbers and hairdressers. Occupational licensing directly a¤ects 29 percent of
U.S. workers, more than those a¤ected by either minimum wage or unionization (Kleiner
and Krueger 2010, 2013). Moreover, while the number of licensed occupations is rising,
the proportion of the workforce being represented by trade unions is falling. Hence, an
understanding of the determinants of licensing restrictions is growing increasingly impor-
tant.
This paper explores the possibility of a link between the number of individuals at-
tempting to enter a profession (potential supply) and the stringency of the entry require-
ments. While the existence of such a relationship is generally accepted in the literature
(a summary is provided in Section 2), there is no direct evidence as to whether potential
labor supply a¤ects entry requirements. This may be due, in part, to the di¢ culty of
measuring the stringency of entry requirements: while licensing boards may adjust the
di¢ culty of the exams, their behavior is not generally observable to the researcher.
This work exploits an unusually rich panel data set on the U.S. market for lawyers.
In this market, accurate data is available on bar exam di¢ culty, the number of exam
candidates and exam outcomes. Detailed data on candidate ability can also be procured.
Another factor making this market well suited for the present study is that the structure
of the bar exam remains the same in the states and years in the sample, whereas the
exam di¢ culty and the number of candidates vary signicantly.
There are large discrepancies in exam di¢ culty across states. For example, when
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holding candidate ability constant, a change in exam di¢ culty from the standard in
Alabama to the standard in California would imply a drop from 79% to 39% in the pass
rate.1 States with more numerous candidates tend to have more di¢ cult examinations
(holding candidate ability constant). Also using within-state variability, I nd a positive
correlation between the number of candidates and bar exam di¢ culty. Accounting for the
possible endogeneity of potential supply increases the estimated correlation between the
two variables. Overall, the paper shows that minimum entry requirements are relative
standards, which are highly correlated with potential labor supply in the profession.
The magnitude of the estimated correlation suggests that licensing boards may signif-
icantly respond to changes in potential supply. Doubling the number of exam candidates
is consistent with an increase of about 8 percent in exam di¢ culty. This implies that
the actual increase in successful candidates may be about half of the increase that would
have taken place without increases in standards. Thus, the licensing exam may partially
shelter the market from supply shocks. More generally, it may a¤ect the return to earning
a professional degree and could dampen the impact of labor market policies targeted at
increasing labor supply. Given the scale of public expenditure on education, it is im-
portant to understand whether professional licensing may inuence the impact of such
public investment on the labor supply.2 Finally, professional licensing may also a¤ect di-
versity in the profession. Since the service industry is a growing source of employment in
developed economies, access to licensed professions may become an increasingly sensitive
issue. This is particularly true for minorities, who provide a growing proportion of work-
ers in less skilled licensed professions. The results of this paper are also relevant for the
debate on the causes and consequences of occupational licensing and the applicability of
1I use for comparison a normal score distribution, with a mean equal to the mean bar exam score and
the variance equal to the mean variance in the U.S. over the period 1981-2003. The grading procedures
for the bar exam are described in Section 3.
2 In 2007, OECD countries devoted 13 percent of total public expenditure to education, of which 3
percent to tertiary education (OECD 2010).
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competition rules in professional markets in the U.S. and the European Union (Andrews
2002; Paterson, Fink and Ogus 2003; European Commission 2004).
2 Related literature
The stringency of entry requirements is the key variable controlled by licensing boards.
The stated objective of entry examinations is uniquely to protect the public from unqual-
ied practitioners. In fact, when standards are changed, there is typically no reference
to changes in market conditions. However, there is agreement among economists that
minimum standards are expected to vary depending on (potential) labor supply in the
profession, since their impact on social welfare and salaries in the profession crucially
depends on the availability of potential entrants. Independently of the exact objective
function of licensing boards, then, potential supply is a key determinant of licensing strin-
gency.3 However, there is surprisingly little empirical research on the subject. In practice,
little is known on how and why entry requirements change.
In one of the early contributions to the literature on licensing, Maurizi (1974) nds
cross-sectional evidence of a negative correlation between the number of applicants and
the pass rate on professional exams. He suggests that this correlation may be evidence
of licensing boards increasing exam di¢ culty in response to excess supply. Although
this evidence is intriguing (and similar results are obtained with my data, see Figure 1),
using pass rates as a measure of licensing strictness has clear limitations, given that they
3There are two main views of licensing. According to Adam Smith (1776, I.x.c.5), the objective of
licensing requirements is to restrain the competition to a much smaller number than might otherwise
be disposed to enter into the trade. According to this classic view, licensing is an ine¢ cient institution
that allows practitioners to capture monopoly rents by restricting entry (Friedman and Kuznets 1945,
Stigler 1971). More recent theoretical studies have focused on the existence of asymmetric information on
the quality of professionals (Akerlof 1970, Leland 1979, Shaked and Sutton 1981, Shapiro 1986). In the
presence of asymmetric information, the licensing board takes into account both the quality-enhancing
and competition-reducing e¤ects of entry requirements. In this setting, if the objectives of the licensing
board correspond to social welfare, licensing may be socially benecial (the public interest theory of
licensing, Leland 1979).
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depend both on exam di¢ culty and candidate ability.
Le­ er (1978) attempts to overcome this problem by developing a proxy for licensing
di¢ culty in the market for physicians. Since candidates can take either a state or a
national examination, the proportion of candidates choosing the state exam is used to
develop a proxy for state exam di¢ culty. Although this is a signicant step forward in
measuring the stringency of entry requirements, the indirect procedure makes this proxy
very imprecise. Moreover, candidate ability remains unobservable, and endogeneity may
seriously a¤ect the analysis (p.182).4
A related stream of literature has focused on the e¤ect of licensing on wages and
on the quality of professional services (Shepard 1978, HaasWilson 1986, Kleiner 1990,
Kleiner and Kudrle 2000, Kugler and Sauer 2005, Timmons and Thornton 2008), and
labor mobility (Pashigian 1979, 1980). Harrington and Krynski (2002), and Harrington
(2007) study the impact of professional licensing in the funeral industry. Federman, Har-
rington and Krynski (2006) analyze the e¤ect of state licensing regulations on low-skilled
immigrants. Law and Kim (2004) study the historical origins of licensing, and Law and
Marks (2009) the impact of licensing on minorities in the progressive era. Pagliero (2010)
exploits changes in bar exam di¢ culty to estimate the e¤ect of licensing requirements on
entry-level salaries in the legal market. Winston, Crandall and Mahestri (2011) discuss
the current policy debate on the regulation of the legal market.
All these studies focus on estimating the e¤ects of licensing regulation on economic
outcomes, implicitly assuming that licensing requirements are exogenously given. This
paper departs from this stream of literature, as it does not focus on the e¤ects of licensing
regulation, but rather on the determinants of the stringency of entry regulation.5
4Kleiner (1990) provides a replication and time-series extension of the model rst estimated by Maurizi
(1974).
5Pagliero (2011) also looks at licensing standards as an endogenous outcome of regulation. However,
the objective of the paper (identifying competing models of licensing) and the empirical strategy are
di¤erent.
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3 Brief overview of the bar exam and the data
The structure of the bar exam is the same in almost all states and has remained sta-
ble over the past two decades. The exam is administered twice a year, in February
and July.6 It consists of two components: the Multistate Bar Examination (henceforth
MBE), a standardized test, and essay and case questions. The MBE contains 200 mul-
tiple choice questions developed by the National Conference of Bar Examiners, who are
also responsible for correcting this portion of the exam. Using the results of a small
sample of questions, which are repeated in di¤erent examinations over time and across
states, scores are scaled so that any single MBE score represents a standard level of per-
formance, regardless of when and where the exam is taken. Hence, the mean MBE score
for candidates taking the exam in a given state and year is a cardinal measure of their
average quality, and exam results can therefore be compared across states and years.7
Essay and case questions are set by state boards and graded at the state level, ac-
cording to criteria set by each board.8 In this case, a particular score does not necessarily
correspond to a standard level of performance across states and years. However, states
in my sample have introduced essay score scaling. The most common scaling procedure
is mean and variance scaling. Mean and variance scaling requires that each essay score
be transformed so that the mean and variance of the distribution of scaled essay scores is
equal to the mean and variance of the standardized test scores (for each exam). The scaled
essay scores are therefore not a¤ected by exam-specic unobserved di¤erences in exam
di¢ culty or in the severity of grading procedures (Crocker and Algina 1986, Peterson et
6Exceptions are Delaware, Nevada and North Dakota, where the bar exam is held only once a year.
7A more detailed description of the MBE can be found at http://www.ncbex.org. A similar standard-
ized test is the Graduate Record Examination (GRE), often used in the admission process to graduate
courses.
8Some states have recently started to use essay and case questions developed by the National Confer-
ence of Bar Examiners (known as the Multistate Essay Examination and Multistate Professional Test).
When this is the case, the Conference provides state boards with possible exam questions and some
analysis of the issues involved in each question in order to facilitate grading. Even when using this
service, state boards grade the answers independently, using locally-set standards.
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al. 1993).9
Under the assumption that the unobserved candidatesquality is unidimensional, the
overall scores (the weighted average of the standardized test and scaled essay test score)
thus share the same metric across states and years and can be compared.10 Since the pass-
fail decision is based on overall scores, the observed minimum quality standards for each
state also share a common metric and provide a simple measure of exam di¢ culty. (In the
rest of the paper, I will refer to the overall minimum quality standard as exam di¢ culty,
or the minimum standard).11 Data on minimum standards is available from either 1984 or
from the introduction of comparable standards (reported in Table 1, column 1), whichever
is later, to 2012.12 Table 1, column 2 reports any changes in minimum quality standards,
while Column 3 reports the corresponding date of each change. Column 4 reports the
minimum quality standard in the last year of the sample. Table 1 thus provides su¢ cient
information for reconstructing the time series of the minimum standard in each state.
Minimum quality standard data is matched with the number of total and successful
candidates for each examination, which is available from the National Conference of Bar
Examiners for each state and year. The data set also includes data on MBE scores,
consisting of MBE mean scores at the state level for each examination. Exam-specic
9An alternative scaling procedure is quantile by quantile equating. The results of the two techniques
are not necessarily the same but di¤erences are empirically small (see Lenel 1992).
10The assumption that the unobserved candidatesquality is unidimensional is consistent with licens-
ing boards setting a single threshold for the overall scores, and not two separate thresholds for each
component of the exam. Overall scores range between 0 and 200, like the MBE scores.
11The weights given to the two exam components may vary across states. Empirically, the weight
given to the standardized test varies between 50 percent and 65 percent. For realistic distribution of
scores and standards, however, these di¤erences do not a¤ect the comparability of minimum standards.
12The main source of standard and grading procedure data is The Comprehensive Guide to Bar Admis-
sion Requirements, published annually by the American Bar Association and the National Conference of
Bar Examiners. This source is complemented by information from various issues of The Bar Examiner,
published by the National Conference of Bar Examiners (NCBEX). When standards are comparable, but
not expressed on a 0-200 point basis, the standards have been converted to a 0-200 basis to increase the
consistency of Table 1. In the Comprehensive Guide there is some uncertainty as to when some standards
changed. Wherever possible, additional sources have been used to pinpoint the exact date of change. In
the few cases where no such data was available, the earliest date compatible with the information in the
Comprehensive Guide was used.
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information was furnished by the state Bar Association or the Supreme Court o¢ ce
responsible for administering the exam. I aggregate the information at the yearly level
by summing the number of total and successful candidates for the two exams each year
and calculating the mean MBE score (weighted by the number of candidates).
3.1 Data limitations
Data availability has been a long-standing issue in the literature on licensing.13 In this
context, my data set provides an exceptionally rich source of information on licensing
board behavior. Still, there are three important limitations in the data set, summarized
in Table 2. First, information on exam di¢ culty is not available for all the states (Table
1 reports information on minimum standards in the 37 states with observable exam dif-
culty). The reason for this is that the introduction of comparable standards based on
standardized scores is a relatively new development in entry examinations. Some states
still use grading procedures that do not allow quantitative comparison. Moreover, al-
though they follow the grading procedures described above, some states do not publish
their minimum standards. Table 3 provides summary statistics for the states with ob-
servable and unobservable exam di¢ culty. States with observable exam di¢ culty have
very similar pass rates and number of candidates per capita, but larger populations and
numbers of bar exam candidates.
The second limit to the data set concerns the availability of mean MBE score data
(measuring bar exam candidatesquality), since only 12 licensing boards chose to provide
this information. This problem is mitigated by using the available data on candidates
quality, pass rates and exam di¢ culty to construct an estimated measure of candidates
quality in each state and year. While closely matching the observed quality, when avail-
13Kleiner (2006, p.199) notes that ...perhaps the largest barrier standing in the way of analysis of
occupational licensing is that there is no well-organized national data set waiting to be exploited. (...)
Moreover, state licensing boards often are reluctant to provide (...) information to the researchers.
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able, this estimated quality measure allows use of information for additional states and
years in the empirical analysis. Appendix 1 describes in detail the construction of the
data set. The third limitation of the data set is that exam di¢ culty is not frequently
changed within a given state (see Table 1), as changes in admission rules typically involve
a lengthy bureaucratic process. This limits the inferences one can make about state spe-
cic responses to changes in potential labor supply. Table 4 provides summary statistics
for the states that changed exam di¢ culty. Relative to the states that did not change
exam di¢ culty (Table 5), they have similar bar exam di¢ culty, candidatesquality, pass
rate, and number of candidates per capita. However, they are larger in terms of state
population and number of bar exam candidates.14
3.2 The Maurizi curve revisited
The negative correlation between pass rates and the number of exam candidates found
by Maurizi (1974) is also a robust feature of my data (Figure 1).15 Maurizi interpreted
this negative correlation as evidence that licensing boards respond to increased poten-
tial supply by increasing entry requirements. Figure 2 challenges this interpretation by
showing that candidate quality di¤ers across states, and that states with better candi-
dates tend to have higher pass rates. Clearly, pass rates are jointly determined by exam
di¢ culty (chosen by licensing boards) and candidate quality (which is not controlled by
licensing boards). Hence, studying exam di¢ culty, instead of pass rates, is a signicant
step forward in studying licensing board behavior.
Figure 3 shows that states with more candidates seem to have slightly more di¢ cult
14One possible explanation for the di¤erence between states with observable and unobservable exam
di¢ culty is that the introduction of comparable standards involves some xed costs, which can be shared
among a larger number of applicants in larger states. Similarly, the di¤erent size of states that did and
did not change exam di¢ culty could be explained by xed costs in changing the minimum standards.
15In Figure 1, the number of candidates is divided by the state population, but similar patterns emerge
without dividing by the state population, or dividing by the number of lawyers in the state.
9
examinations, although the correlation is not statistically signicant.16 Figure 4 shows
that states with better candidates tend to have more di¢ cult examinations. California,
for example, has relatively di¢ cult examinations and a large number of relatively good
candidates. Alabama, on the other hand, has a small number of relatively weak candi-
dates. Figures 3-4 describe the large amount of variability in exam di¢ culty, number
and quality of candidates in my data (see also the summary statistics in Tables 4 and
5). The patterns described in these gures are interesting descriptive results, but do not
necessarily capture causal relations. In particular, Figure 3 is very unlikely to describe
the impact of potential labor supply on licensing exam di¢ culty. This is for two reasons.
First, simple correlations may su¤er from serious omitted-variable bias. In fact, the num-
ber and the quality of candidates are likely to jointly impact licensing board decisions.17
Second, the variability in the number of bar exam candidates (and also their quality) is
unlikely to be exogenous, since exam candidates may choose if and where to take the bar
exam. These are the main topics of the next section.
4 Empirical results
I estimate regressions of the general form
Di;t = b0 +Ni;t 1b1 + qi;t 1b2 + t + i + ui;t (1)
where Di;t is the exam di¢ culty in state i and year t; Ni;t is the log of the number of
candidates; qi;t is the estimated average quality of candidates.18 t and i are state and
16Similar results hold without dividing by the state population or dividing by the number of lawyers
in the state.
17The two variables will generally be correlated in any sample, since they describe two features of the
same group of individuals (who choose to take the licensing exam).
18Estimates are accurate, and using the observed MBE scores, when available, does not a¤ect the
results (see Section 3.1 and Appendix 1 for details).
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year xed e¤ects, and ui;t is the idiosyncratic error term. Since changes in minimum
standards are determined and published in advance, my empirical specication (1) allows
for a lagged e¤ect of potential supply on exam di¢ culty.19
Cross Sectional Evidence
Table 6, columns 1-2 report OLS estimates of the pooled and cross sectional correlation
between potential supply and di¢ culty of the bar exam. The estimated coe¢ cients of the
number and the quality of candidates are positive and signicantly di¤erent from zero.
Adding year xed e¤ects in column 2 does not signicantly a¤ect the coe¢ cients. A ten
percent increase in the number of candidates implies an increase of about 0.08 in exam
di¢ culty (measured on the MBE scale). States with more candidates tend to have more
di¢ cult entry examinations.20 An increase of one in candidatesaverage quality implies
an increase of about 0.7 in exam di¢ culty.
Before commenting on the magnitude of the estimated coe¢ cients, it is important
to note that there are three reasons why the results in columns 1-2 may be a biased
estimate of the impact of potential supply on exam di¢ culty. First, bar exam candidates
are likely to be aware of the systematic di¤erences in exam di¢ culty across states, so
relatively good candidates may be more likely to take the bar exam in states with higher
standards. Weaker potential candidates may be more likely to move to a di¤erent state
or a di¤erent type of job. Such a selection mechanism may lead to an upward bias
in the estimated impact of quality, and a downward bias in the impact of the number
of candidates. Second, candidates preparing for a di¢ cult exam may study more than
those taking an easier examination. Reverse causality may thus further bias upwards the
impact of candidate quality. Third, there may be some omitted state characteristics that
independently lead to high entry standards and high potential supply. For example, a
19Section 4.1 explores alternative specications of (1).
20Similar results are obtained dividing the number of candidates by the population of the state (see
Table A1, columns 1 and 2).
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state may have a particularly good educational system, thus leading to a large supply of
bar exam candidates and high average quality. In principle, such a culture of excellence
may also a¤ect bar examiners, who may then set relatively high standards for admission
to the profession.21
Within State Evidence
Table 6, column 3 reports the results controlling for state-specic xed e¤ects, so
that state-specic unobserved characteristics can be accounted for. The coe¢ cients of
the number and quality of bar exam candidates are still positive. The magnitude of the
coe¢ cients is quite di¤erent from that obtained using cross sectional variability. The
coe¢ cient of the number of candidates is twice that obtained in columns 1-2, while the
coe¢ cient of quality is about half. These changes are consistent with a signicant self-
selection of candidates across states, and/or exam di¢ culty a¤ecting candidatese¤ort in
exam preparation, and/or unobserved state characteristics a¤ecting both potential supply
and exam di¢ culty. Including both state and year xed e¤ects in column 4 does not a¤ect
the estimated coe¢ cients. This suggests that year xed e¤ects are not capturing the e¤ect
of important omitted variables correlated with the regressors and the error term in (1).
I next focus on the sub-sample of states that changed their entry standards. This is
because unchanged standards over a long period may derive from unobserved di¤erences in
how licensing boards choose entry standards, or particularly large adjustment costs. This
implies a substantial reduction in sample size (from 37 to 14 states), but also a reduction
in unobserved heterogeneity. For states that changed exam di¢ culty, the coe¢ cient of
the number and quality of bar exam candidates is still positive and signicantly di¤erent
from zero, and the magnitude of the e¤ects is larger than before. 22
21Similarly, a state may have a particularly high demand for high quality lawyers, thus leading to a
large supply of high quality candidates. This pattern of specialization may also a¤ect the characteristics
of bar examiners, leading to a spurious correlation between potential supply and exam di¢ culty.
22This increase is not surprising. The estimated coe¢ cients cannot be smaller when using only the
data for states that changed di¢ culty. In fact, when using all the states, the estimated coe¢ cients are
an average of the coe¢ cients for states that changed exam di¢ culty and states that did not, but the
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Consider the e¤ect of doubling the number of candidates (by drawing from a given
score distribution) in a hypothetical state with mean exam di¢ culty and mean score
distribution: with no change in exam di¢ culty, about 73 percent (which is the average
pass rate) of the new candidates would pass the exam. In practice, however, the results
suggest that the exam di¢ culty will grow in response to the increased potential supply
by about 3.5 (see Table 6, column 8), which implies that only 61 percent of the new
candidates will pass the exam.23 Hence, about 15 percent of the e¤ect on the number of
successful candidates at the entry examination is o¤set by the increase in exam di¢ culty.
The magnitude of the o¤setting e¤ect of exam di¢ culty is signicant even if we use
the smaller estimated coe¢ cients in Table 6, column 4. Consider now an increase in
candidatesquality of 5 on the MBE scale (approximately the di¤erence between mean
candidatesquality in Maryland and Virginia in Figure 2). This implies an increase in
the pass rate from 73 to 84 percent. However, because of the increase in exam di¢ culty
implied by the coe¢ cient of candidatesquality (Table 6, column 8), only 78 percent of
the new candidates will pass the exam. Hence, the estimated coe¢ cients are consistent
with about half of the e¤ect on the pass rate being o¤set by changes in exam di¢ culty.
Overall, the state xed e¤ects account for signicant sources of potential bias in the
estimates, but endogeneity may still be a problem when using within state variability:
increases over time in exam di¢ culty may in fact result in weaker candidates taking the
exam in a di¤erent state, moving to a di¤erent profession, or studying harder for the exam.
All of these would imply a downward bias in the coe¢ cient of the number of candidates,
latter are zero, since there is no within-state variation in the dependent variable.
23These gures are obtained for an hypothetical state with mean exam di¢ culty (134) and Gaussian
score distribution with mean equal to the mean MBE score (141) and standard deviation equal to 12 (the
mean standard deviation). The relation between pass rate and exam di¢ culty is non linear. Consider n
candidates taking a professional examination. Each candidate receives an overall exam score s; which is
a random draw from the distribution F (s): The di¢ culty of the exam, D; is the minimum quality allowed
in the market. All candidates who score at or above the threshold pass the exam and enter the profession.
The number of successful candidates is then L = [1  F (D)]n and the pass rate L=n = 1  F (D) is non
linear in D.
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and an upward bias in the coe¢ cient of quality. Hence, the o¤setting e¤ect of increases in
the number of candidates is likely to be larger than in Table 6, while the o¤setting e¤ect
of changes in quality smaller. This issue can be addressed using instrumental variables;
these must be correlated with the number and quality of candidates but not with the
error term in (1).24
Instrumental Variables
Bar exam candidates typically need to have a law school degree, which usually requires
at least three years of law school. Within any given state, then, the number of students
admitted to law school three years before a given bar exam is likely to be correlated with
the number of bar exam candidates (after controlling for state xed e¤ects), since many
students take the bar exam in the state where they studied. A similar argument can
be made for the quality of rst-year law school students, which is likely to be correlated
with the quality of bar exam candidates three years later (after controlling for state
xed e¤ects).25 The magnitude and statistical signicance of these correlations can be
estimated; hence the empirical relevance of the instruments can be tested.
Detailed information on class size for each law school in each year is available from the
American Bar Association O¢ cial Guide to Law Schools. Information on the 25th and
75th percentiles of the LSAT score distribution of admitted students for each law school
(from the same source) provides a good measure of the candidatesaverage quality (the
LSAT is a standardized examination used by law schools to screen applicants). The two
instrumental variables are then the number of matriculated students and the LSAT mean
score in law schools for each state and year.26 Since there is no law school in Alaska, the
24A second reason for using instrumental variables is to account for possible measurement error in qit.
25Such correlation is expected to be positive, but not perfect, as students from some top schools (e.g.,
Harvard) tend to allocate themselves nationally. However, Oyer and Schaefer (2010) provide evidence
that law rms tend to hire largely from local law schools.
26As the LSAT is a standardized examination, results can be compared across states and years. The
mean LSAT score for each school and year is estimated as the average of the 25th and 75th percentiles.
This will be a biased estimate of the mean LSAT score if the LSAT score distribution is not symmetric.
However, unbiasedness (or even consistency) of this estimator is not a requirement for using the estimated
14
corresponding observations must be dropped when using instrumental variables.27
Class size and quality of students admitted to law school are unlikely to be a¤ected
by changes in exam di¢ culty three years later. Changes in standards are not typically
announced or even decided so far in advance. The IV approach assumes that the number
and quality of students enrolling in law schools in year t are not correlated with the
unobserved determinants of exam di¢ culty (ui;t+3) in year t + 3: Law school students
can still base their choice on any observable or unobservable characteristic of the state,
captured by the state xed e¤ects. For example, students may choose where to attend
law school based on the specicities of the demand for legal services, the characteristics
of law rms, and of the matching process of lawyers and law rms in each state.
A second requirement for the instrumental variable approach is that the instruments
can be reasonably excluded from equation (1). This is realistic, since the number and
quality of rst-year law school students matters for outcomes in the legal market only to
the extent that they take the bar exam three years later. The behavior of professional
associations is not further restricted. Professional associations can still set exam di¢ culty
as a function of state-specic characteristics of the supply and demand for lawyers in the
state (captured by the state xed e¤ects).
Table 7, columns 1-2 report the 2SLS estimates of the coe¢ cients of potential supply
on exam di¢ culty, controlling for state xed e¤ects. Column 1 includes all the states,
column 2 excludes the states with no change in exam di¢ culty. Table 8, columns 1-
4 report the rst stage estimates. As expected, column 1 shows that the number of
mean LSAT score as an instrument for the 2SLS estimation of model (1). Both LSAT score and class
sizes are aggregated at the state-year level (average LSAT scores are appropriately weighted).
27Data on the instruments is available from 2010 to 1993, then there is a 7 year gap between 1992
and 1986, and nally one usable set of observations for 1985. Given the large gap in the instruments,
observations for the instrumental variables before 1993 were dropped. This implies that the number of
observations in Table 7 is signicantly smaller than for the OLS regressions (given the lags in the IVs,
we can only use observations between 1997 and 2010, rather than 1989-2010). However, when the values
between 1986 and 1992 are interpolated, the number of observations can be signicantly increased. The
results are not a¤ected (see Table A1, columns 7-8).
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matriculated students is positively correlated with the number of bar exam candidates
three years later, after controlling for state xed e¤ects. Similarly, column 2 shows that
the quality of law school students (LSAT score) is positively correlated with the quality of
bar exam candidates three years later (MBE score), after controlling for state xed e¤ects.
These estimated e¤ects are statistically di¤erent from zero at a one percent condence
level. The partial R2 of the rst stage regressions show that the instruments account for
a signicant portion of the variability of the two endogenous regressors. The F-tests of
the excluded instruments in the rst stage are large.28
The 2SLS estimates in Table 7, columns 1-2 show that the coe¢ cient of the number
of bar exam candidates on exam di¢ culty is again positive and signicantly di¤erent
from zero at conventional levels. Its magnitude is larger than in Table 6, columns 3 and
7, which report the corresponding OLS estimates. In order to evaluate the magnitude
of the coe¢ cients, consider again the e¤ect of doubling the number of candidates in a
hypothetical state with mean exam di¢ culty and mean score distribution. The 2SLS
results suggest that the exam di¢ culty may grow by about 11 (Table 7, column 2), which
implies a pass rate of 36 percent. Hence, about half of the e¤ect on the number of
successful candidates may be o¤set by the increase in exam di¢ culty. The increase in the
magnitude of the coe¢ cient of the number of candidates is consistent with some remaining
endogeneity in the within state OLS regression. In fact, selection e¤ects may lead to a
negative correlation between exam di¢ culty and the number of bar exam candidates thus
biasing downward the impact of the number of candidates in OLS regressions.
The 2SLS coe¢ cient of candidatesquality is smaller than in Table 6 and not sig-
nicantly di¤erent from zero. This also supports the idea that within state results were
a¤ected by some remaining endogeneity and biased upward. The IV estimate is also less
precise than the corresponding OLS estimate in Table 6. Hence, on the one hand, the
28The null of weak instruments can be rejected using the thresholds of Stock and Jogo (2002). The
weak instrument problem is generally more relevant in overidentied than in just identied models.
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null of no impact of candidatesquality cannot be rejected. On the other, the power of
the test is rather small, and the 95 percent condence intervals still include values which
imply a signicant e¤ect of candidate quality on the number of entrants in the profession.
The 2SLS results are robust when both state and year xed e¤ects are included
(Table 7, columns 3-4). However, the rst stage coe¢ cients in Table 8, columns 5-8 are
not precisely estimated because of the reduction in the degrees of freedom, and also the
partial R2 are smaller. Hence, 2SLS results with state and year xed e¤ects should be
interpreted with caution. However, given the little e¤ect of adding year xed e¤ects in
Table 6, columns 2 and 6, there seems to be no evidence suggesting that year xed e¤ects
capture important sources of potential endogeneity.
4.1 Additional results
Admission on Motion and Additional Requirements
Although the bar exam is by far the most common admission procedure, admission
to the bar is sometimes possible without taking the bar exam. Lawyers licensed in other
states may be admitted on motion, typically on the basis of reciprocity agreements.29 In
principle, the number of these admissions may a¤ect lawyer supply and may therefore
impact exam di¢ culty. When I include the number of admissions on motion in my
specication, the results are not substantially a¤ected (Table A1, columns 3-6). The
number of lawyers admitted on motion seems to have a positive impact on exam di¢ culty.
Although the magnitude of such an e¤ect is small, this nding reinforces the conclusion
that bar exam di¢ culty is a¤ected by the supply side of the market for lawyers.
In addition to the bar exam, admission to the legal profession also requires passing
29In 2004, there were fewer than 6,000 admissions on motion, but over 49,000 by examination
(NCBEX). Only in D.C. is this the main mode of admission to the bar. However, the results are
not a¤ected when I exclude the corresponding observations from the sample. Direct admission of law
school graduates (by diploma privilege) is signicant only in Wisconsin, which has been excluded from
the sample.
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the Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination (MPRE). The MPRE is a stan-
dardized multiple-choice examination based on law governing the conduct of lawyers,
including the disciplinary rules and principles of professional conduct. Data on the mini-
mum scores required for passing this exam is available for each state.30 If higher minimum
MPRE scores were used by licensing boards as a substitute for a more di¢ cult bar exam,
one would expect that states with higher MPRE thresholds would have an easier bar
exam, all other variables being held constant. However, there are virtually no changes in
MPRE minimum scores, so the regression results including state xed e¤ects cannot be
a¤ected.31
Admission to the bar also depends on meeting educational standards and moral char-
acter and tness requirements. Although educational standards impose signicant costs
on candidates, they do not vary signicantly across states, and are xed for a given
state.32 The procedures for moral character and tness evaluation cannot easily be com-
pared across states and years, but there is no evidence of signicant within-state variabil-
ity.33 Moreover, the existing evidence suggests that these procedures directly a¤ect only
a very small number of candidates.
Alternative specications, GDP per capita, and state-specic time trends
Table A1, columns 9-10 reproduce the results in Table 7, columns 1-2 excluding the
observations after the fourth year following each change in standards. When more than
one change in exam di¢ culty occurs in a given state, all the observations after the fourth
30The MPRE is required for admission to the bar in all but three US jurisdictions. Data on the
number of MPRE candidates and their performance is not available. As opposed to the bar exam, most
candidates take the MPRE during their second or third year of law school, well before applying for the
bar exam. Overall, the complexity of the subjects tested on the MPRE is much lower than on the bar
exam. The breadth of the subject also suggests that much less e¤ort is usually required to pass (this is
consistent with the lower emphasis given by review courses to MPRE preparation).
31When we exclude the one state, Missouri, in which a change in MPRE standard occurred in the
sample period, there is no change in the results.
32Overall, most bar exam candidates hold a law school degree. In 2004, for example, only two states
had more than 10 percent of total candidates without a US law school degree.
33In 2005, 19 states have no published character and tness standards in The Comprehensive Guide
to Bar Admission Requirements.
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year following the rst change are dropped. The objective is controlling for possible
long-run responses of bar exam candidates to changes in di¢ culty. In fact, excluding
these observations implies that the number of rst year law school students and their
quality (the excluded instruments) cannot possibly depend on the observed changes in
exam di¢ culty (after controlling for state xed e¤ects). The results are not substantially
a¤ected.
Equation (1) assumes that licensing boards react to a single lag in potential supply.
However, licensing boards may consider changes in potential supply over multiple years
when revising entry standards. Table A2 provides a second set of robustness results
describing the e¤ect of the average potential supply in previous years. The coe¢ cient of
potential supply is again positive and statistically signicant.34
The main results presented in Tables 6 and 7 control for time-invariant state char-
acteristics and time e¤ects that are common to all the states. These regressions do not
control for time-varying state-specic variables, which may capture long term changes in
the local labour markets. Columns 1-4 in Table A3 report OLS estimates of equation (1)
including real GDP per capita in each state as a control variable. Columns 5-8 include the
manufacturing share of GDP in each state. Finally, columns 9-10 include state-specic
time trends. Table A4 reports the corresponding 2SLS estimates including real GDP
per capita and the share of manufacturing in each state. The coe¢ cients of the number
of candidates are not signicantly a¤ected both in terms of magnitude and statistical
signicance. This suggests that the correlations described in the previous tables were
not due to state-specic economic growth, or changes in the sectorial composition of the
economy.35
34For 2SLS estimation (columns 3 and 6), the denition of the instruments is changed accordingly. The
results are not a¤ected using weighted averages with decreasing weights for longer lags. Similar results
are obtained directly including lags of the number and quality of exam candidates (although standard
errors increase).
35While the results cannot be a¤ected by time invariant characteristics of the licensing boards, one
cannot rule out that changes in how the bar associations are organized (or in the inuence of pro-lawyer
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5 Conclusions
Occupational licensing is one of the most important labor market institutions, yet the
actual behavior of licensing boards is rarely examined because of a lack of data and the
complexity of licensing requirements. While the existing literature typically assumes that
licensing regulations are exogenous, this paper assumes that regulation is endogenous and
studies the possible e¤ect of potential supply on the di¢ culty of the entry examination.
The main nding is that potential supply and the di¢ culty of the bar exam are cor-
related, even after accounting for a number of confounding e¤ects. This is consistent
with supply considerations being an important determinant of licensing requirements. In
particular, increases in the number of potential entrants seem to lead to more stringent
entry requirements, even after controlling for the average quality of candidates.
The existence of a correlation between potential supply and entry requirements has
a number of potentially important implications. Professional markets may be sheltered
from the impact of policies increasing potential supply. For example, a policy increasing
the availability of education, while holding quality constant, may increase the number
of candidates but only partially increase labor supply. A second implication is that
licensing may a¤ect how groups of di¤erent average ability are represented within a pro-
fession. Consider an increase in the number of exam candidates (as the outcome of a
policy subsidizing education, for example) which equally a¤ects all groups of candidates.
As standards increase, groups with lower average performance become less represented
among the successful candidates. For example, since bar exam outcomes vary dramati-
cally across ethnic groups, this e¤ect may signicantly a¤ect ethnic diversity within the
legal profession (Wightman 1998, p.27, reports a 30 percent di¤erence in pass rates be-
lobby groups) may a¤ect the di¢ culty of the exam. Unfortunately, no systematic evidence is available
on changes in these variables. In the market for physicians (also a licensed profession), Law and Hansen
(2010) investigate how licensing board characteristics a¤ect the frequency with which boards discipline
physicians.
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tween African American and white candidates). Even if a similar policy only increases
the number of candidates from a group with relatively low average exam performance, a
decrease in the fraction of successful candidates from such group cannot be ruled out.
From this point of view, it is worth considering the possibility of certication as an
alternative to licensing (Kleiner 2006). Certication permits any person to practice the
profession, but a public or private institution certies those who have achieved a given
level of competence. Certication may increase the e¤ectiveness of policies a¤ecting po-
tential labor supply (without a¤ecting the representation of minorities in the profession),
while still revealing information on practitionersquality.
At a more general level, this paper shows that entry requirements may signicantly
respond to market forces and, hence, are not uniquely based on some abstract notion
of consumer protection, unrelated to market conditions.36 The results of this paper are
clearly consistent with licensing boards restricting entry into the profession in order to
increase salaries (Friedman and Kuznets 1945, Stigler 1971). However, at least in princi-
ple, they could also be explained by public interest theory (Leland 1979), provided there
were large asymmetric information and consumersvaluation for quality (as measured by
the bar exam) were su¢ ciently high. In such circumstances, the social planner trades o¤
the welfare gains from higher quality with those deriving from increased availability of
professionals (and lower prices). Hence, a social planner could partly o¤set increases in
potential supply by increasing exam di¢ culty.
In practice, it seems di¢ cult to explain the results of this paper entirely based on the
public interest theory. First, there seems to be no agreement in the legal profession on
the extent to which performance at the bar exam is an appropriate variable to be used for
screening potential entrants in the legal market (Society of American Law Teachers 2002).
There is also little evidence that consumers value increases in exam di¢ culty (Pagliero
36The stated objective of the bar exam is "to protect the public, not to limit the number of lawyers
admitted to practice" (ABA and NCBEX 2000, p. ix).
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2011), which is a necessary condition for the explanation based on public interest theory.
Moreover, there is evidence that increases in exam di¢ culty lead to increases in entry
salaries in the legal profession, but no evidence that they disproportionately increase
the lower deciles of the salary distribution, which would naturally occur if the bar exam
screened out the worse potential entrants (Pagliero 2010). Finally, there is no evidence
suggesting that di¤erences in asymmetric information across states are large enough to
justify the large di¤erences in exam di¢ culty observed in the data. Still, one cannot rule
out that asymmetric information could be more relevant in states with di¢ cult exams
(e.g., California) then in states with easier exams (e.g., Alabama).
In conclusion, the existence of a link between potential supply and the stringency of
licensing regulation opens the debate on the impact of supply shocks and the e¤ectiveness
of public policy in professional markets. It also contributes to the ongoing debate on how
the interests of the profession may a¤ect labor market regulation.
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Appendix 1. Data construction and sources
The lack of complete information on MBE mean scores is the main limitation of
the data set. However, one can infer MBE scores using information on pass rates and
exam di¢ culty. The procedure is based on the assumption that the shape of the score
distribution is stable over time. More specically, I assume that the state specic score
distribution is Gaussian, with a constant standard deviation.37 Consider, for example,
the exam outcomes in subsequent years for a given state, with a given constant exam
di¢ culty. If the standard deviation of the distribution does not change over time, then
changes in pass rate from one year to the next will reect changes in the location of the
score distribution. Since there is a one to one relation between pass rate and the mean
of the score distribution, changes in pass rate can then be used to infer changes in mean
MBE scores (details provided below).
There are advantages and disadvantages to taking this approach. The main advantage
is that I can partly compensate for the di¢ culty in obtaining information from licensing
boards. Second, I can e¢ ciently use the information on the number of successful and
unsuccessful candidates, which is very precise, complete and publicly available. Hence,
I can increase the number of observations and signicantly improve the quality of the
inference.38 The main drawback of this approach is that some assumptions about the
score distribution are necessary. However, I test the robustness of the results using
alternative assumptions and the results are not a¤ected. Moreover, the proposed method
seems reasonably accurate in capturing meanMBE scores variability, independently of the
specic functional form assumptions. Overall, the advantages from e¢ ciently using the
available information on pass rates seem to outweigh the disadvantages from maintaining
37Although there is no direct evidence at the state level, the available information at the US level
suggest that the overall shape of the score distribution is stable over time. Moreover, the standard
deviation of the score distribution does not show any signicant trend, suggesting that the assumption
of constant standard deviation is realistic.
38The results are consistent with what I would obtain using the original data, but they are much more
precise.
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some assumptions on the score distribution.
The procedure for recovering MBE mean scores is the following:
1. Consider how exam-specic results are generated. Each candidate passes the bar
exam if his/her overall score is above a given threshold. In exam k, in state i,
candidates scores are independent draws from a normal distribution with mean
i;k (equal to the mean MBE score for exam k) and unknown variance 
2
i . Hence,









where F (:) is the cumulative distribution function of the standardized normal dis-
















where Di;k is the observed exam di¢ culty. Using information for the 12 states for
which I can observe Di;k; i;k; Ni;k; and Pi;k; maximization of the log-likelihood
lnL provides estimates of i:39
2. Having estimates of the standard deviation of the score distribution, one can recover
the mean score even when it is not made available by licensing boards. Given how
the pass rate is determined, and the fact that we exactly observe Di;k; Pi;k; and
Ni;k, qi;t can be computed inverting the identity (2),




39The results are not signicantly di¤erent when I assume that scores have a beta distribution, which
can accommodate some skewness in the score distribution.
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where bi is the estimated standard deviation of the score distribution in state i (or




bi; if bi cannot be estimated because i;k is not available).
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Note: D.C. is omitted from the graph as it is an outlier with a large number of candidates (0.0085) and low pass 
rates (0.52). The linear correlation is statistically significant at the 1 percent confidence level (and even more 
pronounced when including D.C.). The blue (small) dots describe state-year observations. The red dots 
correspond to state-specific mean values. 
 












































130 135 140 145 150
Candidates' quality
 
Note: The linear correlation is statistically significant at the 5 percent confidence level. The blue (small) 
dots describe state-year observations. The red dots correspond to state-specific mean values. 
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Note: The linear correlation is not statistically significant. D.C. is omitted as it is an outlier with a 
large average number of candidates (0.0085). The correlation is unchanged when including DC. The 
blue (small) dots describe state-year observations. The red dots correspond to state-specific mean 
values. 
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Note: The linear correlation is statistically significant at the 1 percent confidence level. The blue (small) 
dots describe state-year observations. The red dots correspond to state-specific mean values.
 Table 1. Bar exam difficulty. 
 Starting date of   Bar exam 
State 
comparable 
standards Observed changes Date of change 
difficulty in 
2012 
  in bar exam difficulty  (0-200) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Alabama 1990 - - 128 
Minnesota 1984 - - 130 
Missouri 1984 5, -3 1996, 2005 130 
Montana 1999 - - 130 
New Mexico 1984 3, -3 1990, 96 130 
North Dakota 1986 - - 130 
South Dakota 1989 - - 130 
Connecticut 1984 - - 132 
Illinois 2000 - - 132 
Indiana 2001 - - 132 
Mississippi 1995 - - 132 
D.C. 1984 - - 133 
Kansas 2000 - - 133 
New Jersey 1992 -2 1993 133 
New York 1984 1 2005 133 
Hawaii 1993 - - 134 
Arkansas 2002 - - 135 
Georgia 1984 5 1997 135 
Massachusetts 1984 - - 135 
Nebraska 1996 - - 135 
New Hampshire 1984 -5 2007 135 
Ohio 1984 -10, 3.33, 6.67 1992, 96, 97 135 
Oklahoma 1984 2, 1, 4, 1 1991, 92, 95, 97 135 
Texas 1994 - - 135 
Utah 1991 5 2006 135 
West Virginia 1994 - - 135 
Maryland 2000 - - 135.33 
Florida 1984 2, 3 2003, 04 136 
Pennsylvania 2001 - - 136 
Arizona 1991 -0.17 2012 136.5 
Colorado 1987 - - 138 
Maine 1984 1, 2, 2, -2 1990, 92, 95, 2003 138 
North Carolina 1984 -2.8, 0.8, 0.8, 0.8, 0.8, 1.6 1988, 90, 92, 94, 95, 96 138.4 
Alaska 1992 - - 140 
Virginia 1998 - - 140 
California 1984 4 1990 144 
Delaware 2000 - - 145 
Note: Bar exam difficulty is the minimum overall score required to pass the bar exam (measured on a 0-200 scale) in each state. Data on 
difficulty is available from either 1984 or the introduction of comparable standards (reported in column 1), whichever is later, to 2012. 
Column 2 reports changes in difficulty, while column 3 reports the corresponding date of each change. Column 4 reports difficulty in 
2012. The information in Table 1 allows reconstruction of the time series of exam difficulty in each state.  
Table 2. Overview of data availability on key variables. 
 Observed? Data availability Used in the analysis? 
Bar exam difficulty Yes See Table 1 Yes 
Number of bar exam candidates Yes All states, 1985-2012 Yes 
Candidates’ mean MBE score Only partially 12 states, selected 
years 
No, estimated mean 
quality is used  
Note: Candidates’ mean quality (MBE mean score) is available for Alabama (1989-2001), Arizona (1991-2001), California (1992-2001), 
Colorado (1985-2001), Connecticut (1990-2001), Georgia (1991-2001), Maryland (1987-2001), Massachusetts (1985-2001), Missouri 
(1997-2001), Texas (1990-2001), Utah (1997-2001), and Virginia (1985-2001). See Appendix 1 for details on the estimation of 
candidates’ mean quality.  
 
Table 3. Differences between states with observable and unobservable exam difficulty.  
 37 states with 
observable exam 
difficulty 










Number of candidates (log) 6.64 6.05 0.59 (0.06) 
Pass rate 0.736 0.732 0.004 (0.85) 
Number of candidates / state population (*1,000) 0.251 0.180 0.071 (0.02) 
State population (/1,000,000) 6.03 3.53 2.50 (0.06) 
Note: The table reports mean values for the 37 states with observable exam difficulty (Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, 
Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, D.C., Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, 
Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, 
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and West Virginia) and the 14 states with no observable exam difficulty. 
The statistics are based on the 27 years between 1984 and 2011. 
 
Table 4. Summary statistics (14 states that changed bar exam difficulty). 
 Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Bar exam difficulty  370 134.5 4.25 125 144 
Candidates’ mean quality 370 141.6 3.33 133.1 150.5 
Number of candidates (log) 370 7.14 1.28 5.11 9.65 
Pass rate 370 0.728 0.104 0.374 0.921 
Number of candidates / state 
population (*1,000) 
370 0.253 0.146 0.118 0.804 
State population (/1,000,000) 370 8.94 8.64 0.977 37.7 
Note: The table reports summary statistics for the states with observable exam difficulty that changed exam difficulty at least once 
(Arizona, California, Florida, Georgia, Maine, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, 
Oklahoma, and Utah). Table 1 describes changes in exam difficulty. Bar exam difficulty and candidates’ mean quality are measured on a 
0-200 scale.  
 
Table 5. Summary statistics (23 states that did not change exam difficulty). 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Difference  
(p-value) 
Bar exam difficulty  423 133.8 3.69 128 145 0.771 (0.55) 
Candidates’ mean quality 423 140.9 3.87 129.2 151.7 0.744 (0.48) 
Number of candidates (log) 423 6.33 1.21 3.53 8.31 0.813 (0.07) 
Pass rate 423 0.732 0.099 0.410 0.943 -0.0038 (0.91) 
Number of candidates / state 
population (*1,000) 
423 0.264 0.204 0.053 1.825 -0.0105 (0.86) 
State population (/1,000,000) 423 4.29 4.80 0.57 25.7 4.66 (0.08) 
Note: The table reports summary statistics for the states with observable exam difficulty that did not change exam difficulty. Table 1 
describes changes in exam difficulty. Bar exam difficulty and candidates’ mean quality are measured on a 0-200 scale. The last column 
reports the difference in means between states that changed exam difficulty and states that did not (p-values in parentheses).  

































Number of candidates (log), t-1 0.810* 0.835* 1.712** 1.642** 1.673** 1.857** 3.729** 3.586** 
 (0.450) (0.456) (0.764) (0.804) (0.664) (0.642) (1.364) (1.629) 
Candidates’ mean quality, t-1 0.651*** 0.674*** 0.315*** 0.337*** 0.990*** 1.132*** 0.490*** 0.527*** 
 (0.137) (0.155) (0.0843) (0.0849) (0.128) (0.175) (0.0924) (0.0766) 
Year f.e.?  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
State f.e.?   Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
Observations 793 793 793 793 370 370 370 370 
Number of states 37 37 37 37 14 14 14 14 
Note: The table reports OLS estimates of the impact of the number and quality of bar exam candidates on exam difficulty. In columns 5-8, states with no change in bar exam difficulty 
are excluded from the regression (see Table 1). Robust standard errors clustered by state are reported in parentheses.*** Significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, * 
significant at the 10% level. 
 
 

















Number of candidates (log), t-1 7.235* 11.34** 7.566*** 13.50*** 
 (3.818) (5.344) (2.845) (3.098) 
Candidates’ mean quality, t-1 0.0963 -0.0995 0.886*** 0.435 
 (0.0978) (0.158) (0.305) (0.348) 
Year f.e.?   Yes Yes 
State f.e.? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 539 224 539 224 
Number of states 36 14 36 14 
Note: The table reports 2SLS estimates of the impact of the number and quality of bar exam candidates on exam difficulty. In columns 2 
and 4, states with no change in bar exam difficulty are excluded from the regression. 2SLS estimates are obtained using as IVs the 
number of matriculated students and the mean LSAT score for students accepted into law schools in the same state in t-4. The number of 
observations is smaller than in Table 6 because of limited availability of data on the instrumental variables. In columns 1 and 3, the 
number of states is 36 because the instrumental variables are not available for Alaska. The first stage regression results are reported in 
Table 8. Robust standard errors clustered by state are reported in parentheses. *** Significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% 
level, * significant at the 10% level. 

































First year law school 

















 (3.93e-05) (0.000929) (2.25e-05) (0.000931) (5.79e-05) (0.000960) (6.62e-05) (0.000982) 
LSAT average score -0.00603 0.468*** 0.00561 0.676*** -0.0216* 0.246** -0.00717 0.501** 
 (0.00481) (0.0762) (0.00856) (0.0977) (0.0110) (0.107) (0.0215) (0.191) 
Year f.e.?     Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State f.e.? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 539 539 224 224 539 539 224 224 



















Number of states 36 36 14 14 36 36 14 14 
Note: Corresponding 2SLS results are reported in Table 6. In columns 3-4 and 7-8, states with no change in bar exam difficulty are excluded from the regression. The 
number of observations is smaller than in Table 5 because of limited availability of data on the instrumental variables. In columns 1-2 and 5-6, the number of states is 36 
because the instrumental variables are not available for Alaska, see Appendix 1and 3 for more details on the instrumental variables and data availability. Robust standard 
errors clustered by state in parentheses. *** Significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level. 
  
Table A1. Additional results. 








































Number of candidates 
(log), t-1 







































 (0.100) (0.111) (0.0976) (0.110) (0.0846) (0.0849) (0.243) (0.623) (0.130) (0.351) 
Admissions on 
motion, t-1 








    
   (0.000233) (0.000259) (0.000156) (0.000186)     
Number of candidates 





        
 (2,106) (2,187)         
Year f.e.?  Yes  Yes  Yes     
State f.e.?     Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 793 793 793 793 793 793 710 326 401 86 
Number of states 37 37 37 37 37 37 36 14 31 9 
Note: Columns 1 and 2 report the cross sectional correlation between potential supply and exam difficulty, where the number of candidates is divided by the population in the state. 
Figure 3 describes the simple correlation between these two variables (without controlling for candidates’ quality). In columns 3-6, admissions on motion are the total number of 
admissions on motion in each state and year. In columns 7-8, the number of observations is larger than in Table 7, columns 1 and 2, because all observations from 1989 to 2012 are 
included in the sample (see footnote 27). Column 8 reports 2SLS estimates excluding states with no change in exam difficulty, as in Table 7, column 2. In columns 9-10, 
observations after the fourth year following each change in standards are excluded, this implies a decrease in the number of states in the sample. Column 10 reports 2SLS estimates 
excluding states with no change in exam difficulty, as in Table 7, column 2. Robust standard errors clustered by state are reported in parentheses. *** Significant at the 1% level, ** 
significant at the 5 percent level, * significant at the 10% level. 
 
 

































Candidates’ mean quality, [t-2, t-1] 0.412*** 0.574*** 0.0890 -0.119     
 (0.0899) (0.0945) (0.0895) (0.191)     
Average number of candidates (log), [t-2, t-1] 2.485*** 4.818*** 7.126* 10.75**     
 (0.887) (1.337) (3.833) (5.354)     
Candidates’ mean quality, [t-3, t-1]     0.697*** 0.573*** 0.0938 -0.120 
     (0.153) (0.0993) (0.0954) (0.182) 
Average number of candidates (log), [t-3, t-1]     0.845* 4.354*** 7.284* 11.27** 
     (0.447) (1.311) (3.835) (5.499) 
State f.e.? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 719 342 518 224 756 356 529 224 
Number of states 37 14 36 14 37 14 36 14 
Note: The table reports OLS and 2SLS estimates of the impact of the average number and average quality of bar exam candidates on exam difficulty. The average number of exam 
candidates and their quality is computed for [t-2, t-1] or [t-3, t-1]. The 2SLS estimates are obtained using as IVs the average number of matriculated students and the mean LSAT score 
for students accepted into law schools in [t-5, t-4] and [t-6, t-4] in columns 3-4 and 7-8 respectively. Robust standard errors clustered by state in parentheses. *** Significant at the 1% 
level, ** significant at the 5 percent level, * significant at the 10% level. 






















































































 (0.0717) (0.0867) (0.0750) (0.0887) (0.0783) (0.0850) (0.0822) (0.0768) (0.0803) (0.123) 
Real GDP per 









      
 (0.0141) (0.0237) (0.0217) (0.0571)       
Manufacturing 
share of GDP in 
state, t-1 













     (4.675) (5.946) (5.288) (9.997)   
Year f.e.?  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes   
State f.e.? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State-specific time 
trends? 




Observations 747 747 337 337 793 793 370 370 793 370 
Number of states 37 37 14 14 37 37 14 14 37 14 
Note: The table reports OLS estimates of the impact of the average number and average quality of bar exam candidates on exam difficulty. Real GDP per capita in each state is an 
index equal to one in 2011; the share of manufacturing is computed using current GDP in each state (Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis). Robust standard errors clustered by state 
in parentheses. *** Significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5 percent level, * significant at the 10% level. 
 






































































 (0.112) (0.306) (0.205) (0.335) (0.103) (0.357) (0.176) (0.363) 










    
 (0.0301) (0.0441) (0.0438) (0.0599)     
Manufacturing share of 
GDP in state, t-1 








     (3.771) (10.21) (7.664) (17.35) 
Year f.e.?  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
State f.e.? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 539 539 224 224 539 539 224 224 
Number of states 36 36 14 14 36 36 14 14 
Note: The table reports 2SLS estimates of the impact of the average number and average quality of bar exam candidates on exam difficulty. Real GDP per capita in each state is an 
index equal to one in 2011; the share of manufacturing is computed using current GDP in each state (Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis). Robust standard errors clustered by state 
in parentheses. *** Significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5 percent level, * significant at the 10% level. 
 
